What you will likely and may not get from SDSR 2015

I never like rumours or hearsay but I guess it’s not harm jumping on the pre-Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) 2015 bandwagon.

What will likely be mentioned (in terms of Strategy and Security):

Strategy:

* Government will mean 2% of Gross National Product/Income (GDP/GDNI) of spending on defence.
* Budget (for maybe just equipment) will rise to rise in real terms – 0.5% above inflation – every year during the Parliament (as stated previously in the July 2015 Budget statement )
* NATO will be the core alliance the UK will work with for eternity (or for the super long term), not the European Union (EU)
* Government will also mean the (oudated) Official Development Assistance aka foreign aid target of 0.7% of GDP.
* Focus will be on core areas such as the Middle East (Daesh/ISIS/ISIL), Africa (North and Central)
* Falklands Garrison will stay with no immediate change
* US will be the main strategic ally
* Lancaster House treaty will continue
* Focus will be on value for money–efficiency savings as MOD budget is not ringfenced–but value for strong output
*Linking to above, people such as the Reserves will play a core role in Future Force 2020

In terms of armed forces:

Royal Navy:

* 2 Queen Elizabeth-Class aircraft carriers will be built
* The Type 26 Global Combat Ship/frigate will be built
* 4 x Successor Ship, Submersible, Ballistic, Nuclear) (SSBNs) will be built to retain the UK’s strategic deterrent.
* 7 x Astute Ship Submersible Nuclear (SSN) Astute-Class boats
* 3 x River-Class Batch 2 Patrol Boats (likely to replace the older 3 Batch 1 boats)
* The Mine countermeasures and Hydrographic Capability (MHC) will be considered to replace current Mine-countermeasure vessels
* Merlin and Wildcat numbers will remain
* The Response Force Task Group (RFTG) annual COUGAR deployments will continue, with either Queen Elizabeth-Class carrier joining the RFTG post-2020.
* Unmanned aircraft, surface craft (USV) and undersea craft (UUV) will form the main R&D projects in the future Royal Navy

British Army:

* Army 2020 will continue with some unit changes and some units changing barracks. All units in Germany will return to the UK.
* Ajax (formerly SCOUT SV) production and numbers will continue and stay the same.
* Warrior upgrades aka Warrior Capability Sustainment Programme (CSP) will continue, except that only 245 of them will receive the CTA 40mm gun/cannon (see this article). That is, not all of the six Army 2020 armoured infantry vehicles will gain the new gun/cannon
* Money will be set aside for the Mechanised Infantry Vehicle (former Utility Vehicle, former FRES UV) and the Multi-Role Vehicle-Protected (MRV-P) programmes.
* 50 Apaches will be upgraded to the E version.

Royal Air Force:

* 20 new “Protector” Remotely-Piloted Air Systems (RPAS) will be acquired, a double of the existing number. Basically, updated version of the MQ-9 Reaper.
* F-35Bs will be purchased.
* Trance 1 (T1) Typhoons will be retained to create additional Typhoon Squadrons for UK Quick Reaction Alert (QRA). Tranche 2 and 3 aircraft will thus be free for air-to-ground operations (that is, Operation Shader) (see this link)
* Sentinel R1 aircraft will be replaced.
* Other Intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (ISTAR) aircraft to be upgraded, except the E-3s.

Joint Forces:

* The range of UK Special Forces will gain new equipment.See this news article
* There will be a Multi-Mission Aircraft (MMA), not just a new Maritime Patrol aircraft. (see again this link
* Cyber defences will be strengthened, and the Joint Cyber Reserve will be a key part of this.
* The 77th Brigade (I put this under Joint since it consider of personnel from all services and civilians from other ministerial departments join it) will be a create part of soft power or mechanisms to stabilise or prevent conflict.

These are some of the top issues and assets you may get from SDSR 2015. What you MAY NOT GET or MOST LIKELY WON’T GET:

Strategy:

* Government will not have spare cash or large amount of spare cash to boost the Defence budget beyond 2% of GDP. It may gain funds from the Treasury Reserve, the Conflict Stability and Security Fund (CSSF). The MOD may not have enough money to contribute to the Deployed Military Activity Pool (DMAP), which is a contingency fund within the CSSF, used to support the UK’s emerging in-year security, diplomatic and aid priorities.
* The UK may not, and has not recently been, the second highly country with the largest number of deployed troops in NATO. This level will unlikely be an issue in SDSR 2015.
* The UK will have to depend largely on the US and France should it find itself in a Iraq (Gulf War I mean) or Afghanistan-style conflict. Daesh seems to creating one. SDSR 2015 may not throw in money or personnel into this.
* Personnel shortages may be addressed but not solved in the short or long-term. It would mean lots of equipment without people to operate. More below.
* Chasing targets like 2% and 0.7% would be lots of changing goalposts and a fixation on money not quality. No change in SDSR 2015 for sure.

In terms of armed forces:

Royal Navy:

* SDSR 2015 will not increase personnel strength so that both carriers will operate simultaneously. In fact, snippets indicate that only 450 more sailors will be added to the Royal Navy’s strength. It might mean that HMS Queen Elizabeth won’t operate at full strength, even minus air group. One carrier at all times will most definitely be in port aka extended readiness.
* There will be no definitely confirmation that 13 Type 26 frigates will be ordered. Mybe there could be, but in “drips and draps”.
* There might be, as there always has been, delays to the Astute SSNs boats coming into service. Same with the never to be used Successor SSBNs.
* HMS Ocean may not or never be replaced as a like-for-like. The Royal Navy will have to depend on an aircraft carrier as a strike carrier and a LPH.
* The Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) eldery ships may not be replaced like-for-like.
* The Royal Navy may only end up with the 3 new River-Class Batch 2 ships and HMS Clyde with the Batch 1 ships decommissioned early.
* The MHC project may be delayed.
* Not change in the Merlin HM2/MK2 numbers, so not enough for ASAC and carrier-based ASW roles.
* 809 NAS may have more RAF pilots than Fleet Air Arm (FAA) pilots

British Army:

* No change to Army 2020 in terms of units and personnel. Big adverse implications for units and the Special Forces–see below.
* There may be some removal of 2*s aka Major-Generals or even 1*s Brgadiers who don’t command units. But the Army may still be top-heavy.
* Army Command will change–Deputy CGGS and Commander Personnel Support Command, but that means more money for top commanders not units.
* Challenger 2 will be updated but may not improved or replaced anytime soon unlike this report. So this report is more likely.
* MIV and MRV-P may not appear in the short term.
* No change in CTA turrets or guns/cannon numbers.

Royal Air Force:

* No large order of F-35B aircraft. The orders may likely be in “drips and draps”.
* AMRAAMs may be kept in the long term and there may not be larger numbers of Meteor missile produced or ordered.
* As noted above, there may not be upgrades for all UK ISTAR aircraft or C2 aircraft such as the E-3 which is critical for QRA an operations.
* RAF may end up with more aircraft and still not solving its manpower shortage. This might affect not just the manned aircraft but the 20 new Protectors.

Joint Forces:

* The MMA or at least MPA will not be the highly expensive yet operational P-8 Poseidon. The yet unknown aircraft may not appear in the short term (say 2-4 years) after it is announced.
* The Joint Cyber Reserve may not likely become a full cyber unit despite cyber threats being a Tier 1 threat as identity in the 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS).
* Special Forces will et their new equipment but with the shrunken Army 2020 and Future Force 2020, the various SF units may not be at full strength.

So there you have it folks!!! We wait the announcement around 1530 UK time 23 November 2015.

There were once 16 frigates…can we have 16 again please?

The former UK Coalition government and the present Conservative government has occasionally talked about how they will improve the Royal Navy by mentioning the Type 26 Global Combat Ship/Frigate project. It is stated in many media circles that there will be a “like for like” replacement, that is each of the current 13 Type 23 frigates will be replaced by 13 Type 26 frigates. (See for example this, this , this and this. What some people don’t remember or realise is that there once were 16, not 13 Type 23 frigates in the Royal Navy Fleet.

I’m talking about HMS Norfolk, Marlborough and Grafton, the first, third and twelve ships of the Duke-class frigates. These ships served the Royal Navy for 15, 14 and 9 years respectfully before they were (sadly) transferred to the Chilean Navy as a result of the 2003 Defence White Paper, “Delivering Security in a Changing World”. Norfolk served as part as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)’s Standing Naval Force Atlantic and visited areas such as the Falklands and South Africa. Marlborough was the first ship to be on scene to assist the USS Cole in the aftermath of the Al-Queda-led attack. Grafton, well, she serve in the areas as Type 23s would serve (I can’t find much information on HMS Grafton, anyone who is willing to contribute?)

My point is, these sold-off Type 23s can some use for the Royal Navy during their service. There of course is the debate or debates should they have been sold off and what they could have done if they were kept. Let’s however focus on the future. It is well stated that 13 Type 26 frgates will be insufficient to meet defence/Royal Navy operations or even sustain the Queen Eliabeth-class carrier-led task force. This can be seen in the former Defence Select Comittee’s report Re-thinking defence to meet new threats (particularly page 27). Since the harp is a “like for like” replacement for the Type 23s, why not have 16 Type 26 frigates instead?

This immediately sounds like a “fantasy fleet” idea but it in fact is a plausible plan for Future Force 2020. The extra 3 Type 26s need not be exactly the same as the 8 anti-submarine warfare variants or the 5 General Purpose (GP) variants. They could for example:

1) Have less Mk41 VLS cells and use the remainder stuff for storage space, electronic equipment etc

2) Be used to patrol benign areas like “Atlantic Patrol (North)” or the Caribbean. You don’t need 24 VLS strike cells to chase down smugglers. Nor do you really need 48 Sea Ceptor/CAMM-N missiles unless there is a massive aerial threat to the ship. So the 3 extra frigates could have a reduced displacement by cutting down the number of Sea Ceptor missiles by say a third of a half. This again would free up more space.

3) Having reduced the offensive capabilities does not really mean these extra frigates will be useless. They could be compensated with a larger mission bay so that more Royal Marines or Special Forces could be stored or more of their gear. The hangar could be enlarged so that a maritime Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) and helicopter could be launched simultaneously or that these frigates could carry 2 Merlin helicopters–one for general duties; the other for anti-submairne warfare.

OR
The extra Type 26s could mirror their sister ships. I’ve always wondered why the Royal Navy wished to have the 5-8 system and deny five frigates from having the excellent Sonar 2087. However, since that will unlike change, why not boost the GP variant with 3 extra ships? They could:

1) Again have the same layout as their GP sisters, thus giving the Royal Navy greater anti-surface warfare (ASuW) capability and land-attack options.

2) They could gain have a different or smaller layout and still be deployed as GP ships but for task like anti-mine operations or again, special forces deployment. The former could be a viable option with these extra Type 26 frigates used as “motherships” for the mine warfare vessels instead of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA)’s Bay-class ships. This would allow the Bay Landing Ship Dock (LSD)’s to be used for their primary roles.

There are many other possibilities that the extra thee ships could be used for but I’m sure you get the idea–16 is a number that should be the case, not evne just aimed for. Now of course, there are counter arguments to having more than 13. First, people would say that the Royal Navy personnel strength is not at or anywhere near 1005, as shown in the monthly statistics. So asking for more would be nice, but impractical. Second, as it is with the Conservatives and even some parts of Labour, it would be costly to build so many new warships. Third, people might say 13 is enough since by the thirteenth ship, Scotland might be independent and not allow rUK (rest of the UK) to use its construction yards.

I would say first, personnel strength is critical for all of the British armed forces but for the Type 26, it can be varied and even reduced, especially for three extra ships. Second, costs are relative and it may be the case that the cost could drop or that there could be some sensible funding of the defence budget. As for Scotland, well, the Type 26 is for the current UK and should be so. There are of course other counter arguments, but you get my idea.

So big wigs in the Ministry of Defence and the armed forces, can we please do a proper like for like replacement for the Type 23s?

CAMM: The saviour missile for the British Armed Forces

Everyone on the net for several years now has been talking about the Common Anti-Air Modular Missile or CAMM. It, along with its other support components, is also rather known as the Future Low-Altitude Air Defence System or FLAADS. For the Royal Navy, CAMM will be known as the Sea Ceptor missile (an easier name to remember than the two acronyms!), destined to be fitted on the present Type 23 Frigates and their successor Type 26 frigates (see the official MOD release). CAMM-L, L standing for “Land”, will be the replacement for the ageing or outdated Rapier missile system in the British Army (see the official MOD release).

So what are my views regarding this future missile/missile system? First, the sea version, the Sea Ceptor, is certainly many steps up from the Sea Wolf missile system currently on the Royal Navy’s Type 23s. The first advantage is that of range and altitude. Sea Wolf, a veteran of the Falkland War, has a maximum range of 10 km (the upgraded version) and a flight ceiling/altitude of 3050 m (or around 3000 m). In stark contrast, the MBDA brochure states that CAMM/Sea Ceptor has a range “in excess of 25 km” (let’s just keep it at 25 km). The maximum flight altitude is not stated (so far as I can search, if you know, inform me), but I would gather it should be just a bit shorter than MBDA’s existing Aster 15 missile, which are on the Type 45 Destroyers. (The Aster 15 has a range “in access of 30 km” and flight altitude of 13 km. So I would wager a guess that the Sea Ceptor missile would reach 10 km.)That of course means it might not reach high-altitude bombers/strike aircraft, especially since “Bear” bombers, “Backfire” bombers and others can fly at higher altitudes).

A second crucial advantage for this new missile is it size–99 kg, length of 3.2 m and diameter 0.16m. This means that it can be quad-packed on either the American Mk41 or European SYLVER Vertical Launch System. Now, this link says that from around 2015, the Type 23s will have a “1 for 1 replacement”–32 Sea Wolfs replacement by 32 Sea Ceptors in 8 cell VLS. That’s nice–that means a 8 cell VLS with more room to spare on the frigates.But a stronger advantage for a quad-packed cell means that CAMM can augment the anti-air missiles on board the six Type 45 destroyers. Type 45s currently have 48 ASTER 15 and ASTER missiles in SYLVER A50 0 VLS cells–the actual combination is never known (I would wage 30 ASTER 30s and 18 ASTER 15s, although defenseindustrydaily.com says otherwise.) The DID website recommends by quad-packing 12 SYLVER A50 cells, you can add 48 Sea Ceptor missiles, and have 36 ASTERS–20 ASTER 30s, and 16 ASTER 15. That would bring a total of 84 SAMs to bear in a single Type 45, making in close enough to say the US Navy’s Arleigh Burke-class destroyer or Ticonderoga-class cruisers. (No one can say exactly how many SM-2,3,6 missiles those USN ships carry, since thry also fill their VLS cells with ASROC and Tomahawk missiles).

I would go a bit more conservative and allocate only 8 of the 48 SYLVER A50 cells with Sea Ceptor, that is, a total of 32 Sea Ceptor missiles with 40 ASTER missiles of any combination (I would wager 25 ASTER 30s and 15 ASTER 15s, but then again the exact combination is never known. CAMM’s size then will (if the RN does ever quad-pack them on Type 45s) boost the firepowwer on the 6 most advance destroyers and leave the additional space behind the SYLVER A50 cells purely for ASuW missiles and/or land attack missiles. (This again is just a theory; it is up to the policy makers to decide. The additional space could well be more more Sea Viper/Sea Ceptor missiles, though that would leave the Type 45 again with just a gun.)

A third advantage of the CAMM (N)/Sea Ceptor missile/missile system is its secondary ability to “engage small naval craft”. In other terms, it is able to strike Fast Inshore Attack Craft (FIAC) or in even more layman terms, it has a anti-ship missile attack/anti-surface warfare warefare capability. Now, first thing firsts. Even if the range of the Sea Ceptor is in excess of 25 km, I doubt it can strike surface targets that far away. I would wager say a maximum range of around 10 km. What ever the range, this ASuW capability will give the Type 45, 23 and 26s added ASuW capability. This is especially so for two of the Type 45s, as both of them will not gain the 4 quad-Harpoon launchers leftover from the Type 22s. It also means that all Type 45s gain an AAW/ASuW missile that was missing since the Sea Dart missile retired with the Type 42 Destroyers.

I believe that’s a quite a bit on the CAMM-N/Sea Ceptor. But CAMM’s creation is also crucial for the British Army, to replace their age old Rapier FSC missiles. The British Army’s 16th Regiment Royal Artillery is the main/sole operator of the Rapier missile. As this book suggests, 16th RA’s configuration is “four batteries each of two troops with three fire units per troop”. Each fire unit contains eight ready-to-fire missiles. The missile can strike targets at a maximum altitude of around 3,000m and a maximum range of 6,800m.(Also view this link). If we take the Sea Ceptor adverts range of 25 km to be around the same (land launched and ship launched missiles of the smae kind usually reach difference ranges), it will still mean a new missile with a range more than four times than of a Rapier’s. I would assume CAMM-L’s max altitude should be higher than the Rapier’s 6.8 km as well.

This link (and this) shows a mock up of 12 CAMM-L missiles in a launcher vehicle (name unknown). From the above, one Rapier battery will contain at least 48 Rapier missiles in the two troops, not counting reloads. If CAMM-L is 12 missiles per launcher unit, that would mean maybe two fire units per troop instead, create personnel reduction and thus benefits. Beyond this of course, having CAMM-L as a replacement for Rapier would mean much stronger protection of brigades/the Falklands/which every unit against not just aircraft but ballistic missiles and possibly even unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). If all turns out well, CAMM will arrive just as the Rapier bows out in 2020. Definitely one missile need by the British Army for quite a long time especially given the threat of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), airstrikes from manned aircraft and helicopters or even surface-to-surface missiles which as prevalent in “Eastern bloc” armed forces (9K720 Iskander, though I’m not finger pointing).

CAMM is also slated to be CAMM-A/CAMM (A), replacing or complementing the really good ASRAAM. This article will, however, not cover that area. First, there’s little talk about the aerial variant, and secondly, there’s nothing that spectacular since the ASRAAM is (as stated) a pretty good missile. Anyway, the Sea Ceptor variant and the CAMM-L (or whatever name the British Army will give the land variant) provides the British Armed Forces of the future with a missile that should create a potent Future Force (FF) 2020. The missiles characteristics is definitely what the Army and the Navy requires, regardless whether the number of assets (ships and land units) increase or decrease after defence reviews. A saviour for the Armed Forces…

PS I know, abrupt ending. Will edit and expand later.