More Admirals (including Commodores) than warships? A look at Royal Navy Senior Officers

Ok, this will be a series of three separate posts, each focusing on the size of senior officers in respectively: the Royal Navy, the British Army and of course the Royal Air Force. As the title suggests, the comparison is the number of senior officers versus the combat equipment or capability in each armed force. A further question would consider if the ratio is a matter of concern for each armed force and the British Armed Forces as a whole. Do note this will be a pretty long article so get ready!

Why examine this topic you may ask? Well one, most defence commentators and specialists focus on hardware and warfare and policy and senior personnel size is hardly and issue. Second, it has been brought up by tabloids, right-wing newspapers and commentators before, thus I wish to settle the argument.

Anyway, first up, the Royal Navy. Most people know the Royal Navy has a First Sea Lord, who is a full admiral, or by more layman definition, a four-star admiral or in NATO terms, OF-9. There’s a Sea Lord, many people think he’s also a full admiral, but since 2005, the naval officer holding that appointment is a Vice-Admiral (three-star or OF-8). Beyond these two, how many other Royal Navy admirals are there?

This isn’t easy as first the Royal Navy doesn’t just have admirals; it has Commodores (OF-6s) and second senior Royal Navy officers don’t just get assigned only to the Royal Navy or Navy Command; they get posted to MOD HQ, Defence Equipment & Support, Defence Infrastructure Organisation, allied forces (eg. NATO) or even non-military postings. Furthermore, there isn’t really a centralised database containing the list for all senior British officers. This of course brings up the topic of OPSEC; no country would want to release such data in wartime or peacetime. Yet in the recent era of transparency, the UK has been more transparent in its statistic and yes, they have released such a list before but closed it as Deborah Haynes claimed that Islamic terrorists would target these individuals. While that could be a possibility, well, if you look at the London Gazette under defence, names and occasionally appointments of junior and senior officers have been announced since around 1655 so that argument does not stand.

Anyway, yes for the Royal Navy, they do give you a list of senior officers from Commodore to Admiral of the Fleet: they publish a Navy List (formerly the Navy Directory) updated around June or July annually, the latest list can be found here. This gives mainly the list of senior officers in Navy Command, the HQ of the Royal Navy and as I mentioned above, Royal Navy personnel get posted elsewhere. For a wide range of British senior officers and where thy do get posted to, have a look at the MOD’s organisation charts which aren’t always up to date and do not contain all names. To discover the full range of senior Royal Navy personnel by rank and appointment, the best source is from historian Colin Mackie aka gulabin.com: Look at his lists regarding current Royal Navy Commodore’s and Admirals and senior Royal Navy appointments from centuries ago!

Using these four lists, here are the list of Admirals and Commodores by appointment:

Note: I will not publish the full names for security and privacy reasons.

Further note: ‘Variable’ means the appointment won’t always be held by a Royal Navy officer so the total count fluctuates.

List of Admirals (full admiral aka OF-9):
Chief of Naval Staff/First Sea Lord

Total: 1

List of Vice-Admirals:
Deputy Chief of Naval Staff/Second Sea Lord
Fleet Commander
Commander, Allied Maritime Command (NATO)
Chief of Joint Operations (variable)
Chief of Staff, Allied Command Transformation (NATO) (variable) (will take up appointment later in 2018)

Total: 5 (without variable: 2)

List of Rear-Admirals:
Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (Policy) (ACNS (Policy))
Commander UK Maritime Forces (COMUKMARFOR)
Commander Maritime Operations (COMOPS)
Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (Aviation, Amphibious Capability & Carriers) (ACNS(A&C))
Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (Personnel), Naval Secretary
Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (Ships) (ACNS (Ships))
Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (Submarines) and Flag Officer Scotland & Northern Ireland
Flag Officer Sea Training/Assistant Chief of Staff Training (FOST/ACNS (T))
National Hydrographer
Director Submarines Support (DSMS) and Chief Strategic Systems Executive (CSSE)
Director, Submarine Capability, Defence Nuclear Organisation
Director Submarines Acquisition
Director Ships Acquisition, Defence Equipment Support
Deputy Commander, Naval Striking and Support Forces NATO
Director, Carrier Strike, MOD
Head of Capability and Programmes, Defence Nuclear Organisation
Deputy Commandant, Royal College of Defence Studies (variable)
Director (Capability), Joint Forces Command (variable)
Commander, Joint Helicopter Command (variable)
Director Technical Military Aviation Authority (MAA) and Chief Technical Officer MAA (variable)
Senior British Military Representative, US Central Command (variable)

Total: 21 (without variable: 16)

Note: There is also an Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (Capability) (ACNS (Capability)) who can be a Rear-Admiral but currently that appointment holder is a Royal Marines Major-General (see below). 

List of Commodores:
Head of Naval Staff
Head of RN Communications (Media Comms Hd)
Commander Regional Forces (CRF) & Naval Regional Commander Eastern England (NRC EE)
Naval Regional Commander Northern England (NRC NE)
Commander UK Task Group (COMATG)
Commander Carrier Strike Group (COMCSG)
Commander Portsmouth Flotilla (COMPORFLOT)
Commander Devonport Flotilla (COMDEVFLOT)
Commander Faslane Flotilla (COMFASFLOT)
Assistant Chief of Staff Carrier Strike & Aviation (ACOS CSAV)
Commanding Officer RNAS Yeovilton (CO VL)
Assistant Chief of Staff Warfare (ACOS W)
Assistant Chief of Staff Information Warfare (ACOS IW)
Naval Assistant (NA) (to the Naval Secretary)
Assistant Chief of Staff (People Capability)
Assistant Chief of Staff (Medical) (ACOS MED)
Commander Maritime Reserves (COMMARRES)
Assistant Chief of Staff Engineering Support (ACOS Eng Spt)
Assistant Chief of Staff Logistics & Infrastructure (ACOS Logs & Infra)
Commanding Officer HMNB Portsmouth (NBC(P))
Commanding Officer HMNB Devonport (NBC(D))
Commanding Officer HMNB Clyde (NBC(C))
Assistant Chief of Staff Ships (ACOS Ships)
Assistant Chief of Staff, Submarines (ACOS Submarines)
Assistant Chief of Staff (Training) (ACOS T)
Commander Operational Training (COM OT)
Commander Core Training (COMCORE)
Assistant Chief of Staff Resources & Plans (ACOS RP)
Head of the Shipbuilding Programme Strategy Team
Director Ships Support Common Support Model Programme, Defence Equipment and Support
Head Warship Support, Defence Equipment and Support
Type 26 Project Leader, Defence Equipment and Support
2 x Commodore , Defence Equipment and Support (unknown roles)
Head, Change and Transformation, Submarine Delivery Agency
Head Submarines In-Service, Submarine Delivery Agency
Head Submarines Nuclear Propulsion, Submarine Delivery Agency
Commodore, UK Submarine Delivery Agency (responsibilities unknown)
Deputy Commander Combined Maritime Forces (DCCMF) and Commander United Kingdom Maritime Component Command (UKMCC)
UK Naval Attache to the United States
Head Defence Maritime Regulator, MOD
Head of Nuclear Operations, MOD or JFC
Assistant Commandant (Maritime), Joint Services Command and Staff College
Deputy Director, Combined Joint Operations, Sea Centre of Excellence, US Fleet Forces Command
Head, Capability and Cadets, Reserve Forces and Cadets (variable)
Commander, British Forces, Gibraltar (variable)
Head of Defence Logistics Strategy, MOD (variable)
Commander, Standing Joint Force Logistic Component (variable)
Head of Armed Forces Remuneration, MOD (variable)
Executive Coordinator, International Military Staff and Secretary, Military Committee, NATO (variable)
Head UK Military Flying Training Systems, Defence Equipment and Support (variable)
Head of Finance and Military Capability, MOD (variable)
Defence Attache to the People’s Republic of China (variable)
Head of Military Operations, MOD (vague appointment) (variable)
Head of Regulation and Certification, MAA (variable)
Defence Attache to Oman (variable)
Head of Policy-Training, Education, Skills and Resettlement/Commemorations and Ceremonial, MOD (variable)
Chief of Staff, Standing Joint Force HQ, JFC (variable)
Commander, Combined Task Force 150, CMF (variable)
Head of Medical Operational Capability, Surgeon General, JFC (variable)
Commander Defence Primary Healthcare, Surgeon General, JFC (variable)
Head of Capability C4ISR, JFC (variable)

Note: There are also around 9 Commodores (including a Surgeon Commodore) with no clearly defined appointments, many who are studying at the Royal College of Defence Studies (RCDS) or just completed their assignment. As with Rear-Admirals, some Navy Command appointments that may go to Commodore are currently held by Royal Marine Brigadiers, namely 1) Naval Regional Commander Wales & Western England (NRC WWE) and 2) Assistant Chief of Staff Maritime Capability (ACOS Mar Cap).

Total:62 (without variable: 44)

(I hope I got my list of appointments and numbers correct!)

In total: 1+5+21+62 = 89 senior Royal Navy officers. If you exclude the ‘variable(s)’, then it is 1+3+16+44=64 senior Royal Navy officers.

So back to the question: Are there more admirals (including Commodores) than warships? There are many definitions of what a warship is but in this case, I consider warships as all commissioned Royal Navy ships those than can fight and armed with weapons. So based on all available sources there are at present: 1 x CVF, 6 x SSNs, 4 x SSBNs, 2 x LPDs, 6 x Destroyers, 13 x Frigates, 3 x Patrol Vessels (River-class) and 13 x MCM vessels bringing you to a total of 48 ‘warships’. (Even as the rest of the Royal Navy ships do have weapons, I don’t consider as warships).

So yes, there are more Royal Navy admirals (and commodores) than Royal Navy warships, even if you exclude those in Royal Navy senior staff in joint and allied appointments. The ratio, 89:48 or 64:48 may seem large to some who want a culling of top highly-paid armchair people. Yet to others, especially me, the question is why should you just immediately cull the top and what benefits does it create for this small Royal Navy? Putting it another way round, are there too many commodores and admirals for the current Royal Navy? I’ll stop here and deal with these questions in a later post while I figure out the next post of British Army generals and brigadiers versus British brigades.

To end of, I provide you with this humorous, outdated though quite relevant link by Bird & Fortune.

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Gavin Williamson in the Asia-Pacific: What sort of defence engagement? Part II

What sort of involvement?

We do get suggestions what exactly the UK should deploy to the Asia-Pacific, but more often than not, they are just voices for grandstanding. Some are just list of ideals like this from the Henry Jackson Society (HJS) a whole list of what should be UK activities in the Asia-Pacific, now and post-Brexit. What really should be the UK’s plausible response to ensure stable security in the Asia-Pacific?

The UK military and political system actually is responding without such idealistic delusions of grandeur. First, the UK should continue or even try to slowly enlarge its permanent and temporary military presence in the region. British military deployments in Southeast Asia are already significant, despite what the analyst at HJS or other think tanks claim. The British Defence Singapore Support Unit (BDSSU), aka Naval Party 1022, is extremely well-valued by not just FPDA nations but other allied and nation-states in the region. It may not be as well-broadcast in social media or the mainstream media, but it continues to provide around 1200m3 of fuel of fuel fuel to nearly warships and ships almost every two years (Source: FOIA). There’s also staff officers assigned to Singapore’s Information Fusion Centre (IFC) and more staff assigned to the Integrated Air Defence System at RMAF Butterworth as part of the FPDA. Further afield, there’s the Gurkha regiment in Brunei and as you’ve seen some ship and aircraft deployments. All these are not symbolic gestures or ‘spreading the defence jam thin’ but maintaining a strategic role and some degree of deterrence.

Can they be improved or increased? Not exactly to extremely level which the HJS analyst describes in a short period. The UK cannot also base large-scale military forces there without increasing military tensions. It, however, should maintain its personnel in FPDA and Asia-Pacific countries and send military deployments more regularly. I don’t mean a five year-gap between HMS Daring’s deployment and HMS Sutherland’s deployment, but more regular Royal Navy ship and submarine visits, British Army unit (not just personnel deployments) and RAF squadron-level deployments to FPDA exercises and with other Asia-Pacific partners. The UK simply sends personnel for FPDA exercises. It should instead send physical ships (not ship), at least platoon-sized forces and more RAF flights
to FPDA exercises to strongly affirm its role in this pact. It was already announced that the UK would deploy HMS Queen Elizabeth and its escorts. That deployment requires much financial cost and willpower and this ultimate aim should be slowly built up with more regular deployments to maintain the momentum.

Second, the UK has long-standing defence engagements with the region which can be and should be easily altered to a larger degree. Defence engagement here means not just military deployments but through personal engagement. Sir H has given an overview, albeit outdated of the roles of British Defence Attaches play in the region and globally. To update his overview, the UK has OF-6-level defence attaches in Australia, China, South Korea and non-resident accreditation (NRA) with North Korea (based in China) while the UK attache in Japan is of OF-5. Closer to Southeast Asia, British defence attaches are of OF-5 ranks in Brunei, Burma/Myanmar, Indonesia, Malaysia, The Philippines (NRA in Brunei), Thailand and Vietnam. Finally the defence attaches in Singapore and New Zealand are at OF-4 rank.

Singapore’s defence attache used to be at OF-5 rank until 2014 (see p.21) and this ‘reduction’ in my view is regrettable. This was made up as the 2015 SDSR promised the creation of a British Defence Staff (Asia Pacific) which materialised in 2016. The head of this British Defence Staff it of OF-5 rank assistant by a OF-4. On top of the these senior ranks, there is at least one British officer at the Information Fusion Centre in Changi, Singapore and more MOD civilians to sustain the BDSSU and defence attaches in the region. Defence attaches don’t just attend military events and talk to their host nation counterparts; they engage with them to deep bilateral relations and facilitate ship docking and joint military actions; they act as ambassadors for British defence exports (I mentioned the example of the Typhoon as a possible consideration for the RMAF) and they do report on military activities, aiding UK’s Defence Intelligence branch.

Give this impressive range of Defence attaches, you might think there’s no need for any change. Well, there could areas that could be strengthen. The UK has formed a strong alliance with Japan as pledged in pre-Brexit 2015 SDSR. The UK could or should elevate its defence attache is Tokyo to a OF-6 rank so as not just affirm this new relationship but also to place the defence attache on par with his/her counterparts in Beijing/Pyongyang and Seoul. One immediate challenge for this elevation is that the cost of living in Tokyo or Japan is extremely high. This is also probably why the defence attache in Singapore was reduced in rank. Second, higher-rank defence attaches need to be matched with responsibilities equal to their rank. One area the British Defence Attache in Japan or his/her assistant could work on is to created a Naval Support facility at a Japanese port, something akin to the support facility at Mina Salman port in Bahrain. This would improve support Royal Navy or other British Armed Forces transiting up to East Asia.

Beyond defence attaches, the UK should improve partnerships with more exchange personnel or personnel embedded in Asia-Pacific military forces. The UK already has a Royal Marine Brigadier as Deputy Director, International Logistics and Security Co-operation at U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. Recently, a Royal Navy Commander was was appointed as a liaison officer to the JSDF. These are great establishments and the UK could expand this, placing officers in other armed forces such as South Korea’s and Japan’s. Thhe UK should continue to train Asia-Pacific personnel in the whole range of British Armed Forces and likewise send British personnel on exchange in Asia-Pacific militaries to learn about their training and standard operating procedures. In fact, in 2014, two junior British Army officers went on an exchange with the PLA ground force academy. Yes you may detest how they force march and eat, but such inter-military exchanges bring about greater understanding of each other’s practices and culture, thus aiding British Defence Intelligence.

Third, the UK has engaged with the Asia-Pacific region through visits with defence-related visits by UK officials and politicians. Yes this link mentioned a whole host of them visiting Singapore. Yet, this was a one-off and most of them were just short conferences or meetings. US, Australian and other Asian leaders and senior officers have often conducted visits to maintain or strengthen relationships and the UK should like wise perform such exchanges. In Part I, detailed Williamson’s trip before and during the Shangri-la Dialogue. UK Ministers and the CDS or VCDS should affirm that they will attend this annual conference which only requires a hop on to either the RAF VIP Voyager or a normal flight. In the event of any UK General Election like in 2017, the UK MOD’s Permanent Secretary can take the place of the Secretary of State. All this would again deepen defence and security relations with individual countries or wider Asia-Pacific pacts like the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM-Plus). Closer exchanges could even result in awards to UK military leaders.For example, Former CDS Nick Houghton received an an honorary Panglima Gagah Angkatan Tentera (PGAT) or Knight Grand Commander of the Order of Military Service from Malaysia back in 2015. So you do get some personal awards through engagement with your counterparts.

This talk about engagement with Asia-Pacific officials also extends to British academics and journalist. Yours truly has seen so many of these two groups believe 1) Britain no longer needs to look East or care about the Asia-Pacific; 2) call it the archaic ‘Far East’; 3) spew anti-Asian or specifically anti-Chinese rants (Prof you know who, I’m talking about you) 4) or say the UK should mainly or only focus on the NATO front. Some of these have designated titles like reporter for Asian issues or Lecturer/Senior Lecturer/Assistant or full Professor for East Asian studies. Yet they have never stepped a foot in this geographical region and only claim that China or North Korea or Vietnam is not democratic or capitalistic enough to receive UK/Western support. Hardly any of them have been to security dialogues like the Shangri-la Dialogue but are happy to spew unsubstantiated comments which do affect UK policy. If British youths can backpack through the region and post photos of themselves (sometimes topless, haha) on mountain tops, surely journalists and academics can visit the region (well clothed). Such visits of course may not change their pro-Europe or narrow-minded or anti-Asian views, but at least it is a start of stronger understanding. Plus, if they at least try for the Shangri-la Dialogue, who wouldn’t want to be in such a nice hotel?

A bridge not too far

Yes, it is not a such a great if there are more engagement by British government, military and media officials with the Asia-Pacific region. It may be a bridge quite far to increase UK military deployments to the Asia-Pacific (again please do not say Far East) given how UK financial and willpower appears at present. There is a slight glimmer of hope in the Modernising Defence Programme (MDP) that will be, hopefully, released in a few week’s time. The recent NSCR did mention the importance of the wider Asia-Pacific to UK National Security, but it is quite doubtful whether the MOD-led MDP will back this up. Beyond all this, I again emphasise UK willpower needs to increase in order to meet and sustain any increase in UK defence and security policy toward East Asia. Gavin Williamson has supposedly started a battle with Philip Hammond over the size of the defence budget. I have mentioned the Treasury is a constantly target whenever defence commentators see the size of HM Armed Forces as shrinking. The feud actually should be beyond financial terms: They should fight over whether the UK should stay in its backyard or see that wider areas like the Asia-Pacific region. Only if there’s a strong willpower will any of the above suggestions actually happen and we will actually see the Union Jack flying high to maintain security in the Asia-Pacific.

Gavin Williamson in the Asia-Pacific: Why the UK must have defence engagement with that region Part I

While many British people were either complaining about the weather or worrying about Brexit, Secretary of State for Defence Gavin Williamson and his delegation were abroad seven hours ahead of GMT plus 1 time. Namely, Williamson was in Malaysia, then Brunei and finally in Singapore for the annual Shangri-la Dialogue, or as known in social media circles as #SLD18.

First stop, Malaysia and Brunei

These twitter posts thisone and this from the UK High Commissioner to Malaysia showed that he first met with the new Malaysian Defence Minister Mohamad Sabu. Naturally, no one knows what Williamson and Sabu exactly discussed, but Malaysia is a Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA) member, and a key importer of British defence equipment for decades. For example, Malaysia has bought Starstreak missiles and may be aiming for the Eurofighter Typhoon, once it gets its finances in order.

Williamson then headed further eat to Brunei, where most Brits love for its exotic nature and mountains, but in the case of British defence policy, there has been a British Army base there, more specifically a Gurkha regiment. Jokes or no jokes, Williamson watched how jungle training is conducted and received a garland from them.

To Singapore for the Shangri-la Dialogue or SLD18

Photo op with the Gurkhas over, William head back west to Singapore, where SLD18 was occurring. In true British defence media fashion, his appearance was only announced late only on the first of June. Information on Williamson’s activity came from other media, specifically Singapore’s Ministry of Defence (MINDEF), which noted he was hosted to a breakfast meeting with his FPDA counterparts by Singapore’s defence minister Ng. (Piece of trivia: Williamson is the youngest and second most recent FPDA minister.) Next, Williamson met up with the Prime Minister of Singapore, most probably discussing about general UK-Singapore topics. What was more surprising was later that day, Williamson and Singapore’s Defence Minister Ng signed a Defence Cooperation Memorandum of Understanding (DCMOU), promising greater cooperation in defence areas such as cyber-security and information warfare, as well exchanging knowledge over counter-terrorism and counter-improvised explosive device (IEDs). For a country far away from Southeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific, one which has reduced its presence since the handover of Hong Kong, this MOU might be a definitive re-construction of a UK-Singapore and UK-Southeast Asian relationship.

Williamson’s major day was on Sunday 3rd of June, the last day of SL18 where he on a panel with French Minister for the Armed Force Parly and Singapore’s Ng.. His speech was pretty traditional by British political sound-bites. What I mean is that he talked about the so-called ruled-based order which nation-states are suppose to follow but increasingly have not. Williamson, as have other British politicians, drew up the example of the Salisbury/Skirpal attack as an example. But that is hardly one, since many nation-states, not just Russia and China, have not played the ruled-based order but for their own interests. Anyway, Williamson continued stating much of UK contributions of Asia Pacific story, such as the deployment of HMS Sutherland, HMS Albion and later this year HMS Argyll. Those have been mentioned many times in social and mainstream media. Similarly, Williamson (possibly proudly) announced that British Army personnel would deploy to Japan later this year for bilateral exercises. This again isn’t new; it has been announced before. Williamson then joked that the UK need to send more ships to the Asia-Pacific, since France sent five warships to the region in 2017 and in 2018 This joke is probably Williamson’s highlight at SLD18, you may search the rest of twitter for the summary or comments about his speech in this thread.

Update: IISS has uploaded his speech here (You have to download it to read or watch the full video of all three speakers.)

What’s all this fuss about Williamson’s Southeast Asian trip?

I know Williamson has been mocked by journalist for comments about Russia but seriously, twitter users should stop tweeting about that and tweet more about his time in Southeast Asia. This especially is because this is 1) his first major trip to this region and 2) his  inaugural trip to the region’s most prominent conference (in 2017, no UK politician attended the SLD; only CDS Air Chief Marshal Peach did since it was after the 2017 General Election.) In fact, besides Williamson, HMS Sutherland was docked there, visited by the Commander Devonport Flotilla Flotilla. VCDS General Sir Gordon Messenger was also at the conference, speaking on new technologies and the future of conflict, therefore presenting a truly prominent British presence at the SLD. But, wait, some defence commentators (I shall not name who), will say all this is just ‘spreading the defence jam thin’. They say, oh, sending these warships and these troops are tokens and won’t have much of an impact. The UK should concentrate on the Euro-Atlantic area, where NATO is a core military alliance, or the Middle East, or Africa and leave the distant Far East/Asia-Pacific to the US of A, Trump or whoever is in the White House. They drum the beat, the UK has no interest in the Asia-Pacific, the world will be divided, let’s focus on home…

I sincerely disagree. This has been tried before in history, during World War Two. Then the UK prioritised its forces on its home front. That may be a sound decision, yet it resulted in Imperial Japan defeating British and Commonwealth forces in the Far East. Even closer to British shores, it initially suffered defeated in North Africa before defeated the Nazis. Ok, one might still argue that at present with the worry over Brexit, rising threats from closer state actors like Russia and extreme-Islamist terrorism may suggest the focus should be at home. For example, Sir Humphrey in fact wrote that the region pose little military threat to the UK.

Yet, that assessment was back in 2012 and six years later, China has reclaimed land in that disputed area, massing long-range anti-ship cruise missiles and air-defense missiles. The PRC has also harassing fishing ships around those waters. Closer to home, China has also possibly meddled with UK security through ownership of the Hinkley Point nuclear power station. Then There is also the North Korean crisis. Yes, North Korea is a huge distance away from the UK, it is Trump’s fault for adding fuel to the fire, yet the DPRK has launched a cyber attack an a chemical attack that actually killed someone. In the wider scope, even before the Brexit referendum, East Asia was a highly important economic powerhouse and a more crucial trading bloc for the UK due to its stellar economic growth and technological advancement. Now, whatever type of Brexit approach the UK takes, the East Asian/Asia-Pacific region will definitely continue to be a critical area for UK economic security and survival (just check the World Bank trade statistics for example). If the defence of the realm is the first priority of government, then protecting trade routes in the Asia-Pacific and preserving economic security there is not a cheap token, but a core duty. It is certain not ‘spreading the jam thin’ but preventing any pest or new pest from eating your beloved crops.

This is the end of Part I. Part II will discuss the range of plausible, not possible UK responses to ensure security in the Asia-Pacific.

Thoughts on the National Security Capability Review

The UK’s National Security Capability Review (NSCR) was released without much funfare in March 2018. Rather than open it up with a parliamentary debate, it was just stated via a Written Ministerial Statement, then posted online on the gov.uk website. Along with the NSCR, a Cross-Government Funds Review (also not debated and released in a Written Statement) was published, basically a summary of the Prosperity Fund Annual Report 16-17 and the Conflict Security Stability Fund (CSSF) Annual Report 16-17. In this article, I’ll be concentrating mostly on the NSCR and partly on the upcoming Modernising Defence Review (MDP).

Background

The NSCR arose from the 2015 NSS & SDSR (here after known as SDSR 2015) because there were  new “uncertain [and] volatile” threats since 2015 and the NSCR is to:

identify how we [the UK] could develop, deliver and deploy our considerable national security capabilities to maximum collective effect.

. The Joint Committee for National Security Strategy (JCNSS) gave a stronge and more closely-examined an excellent investigation on how the NSCR came about (see National Security Capability Review A changing security environment pp.8-19.) A written evidence to the House of Commons Defence Committee also provides a succinct timeline how the NSCR and later the MDP came about. Basically, the NSCR took a heck of a long time to come about from April 2017 to March 2018, probably longer than SDSR 2010 and SDSR 2015.

One should also note that the 2017 annual report of SDSR 2015 is also mixed within the NSCR. Previously, the 2016 report or Corporate report was published as a separate piece. Stepping back, the NSCR is unique as this is the first review of a SDSR and maybe even all British defence reviews. Ok, previously, there was a New Chapter added to the 1998 Strategic Defence Review but I wouldn’t consider that a review of a review. It certainly is confusing.

What is in this NSCR anyway?

As much as they say this NSCR is not a SDSR-like review, it contains wording like any previous Defence Review. The first part already states a whole series of pledges. These pledges are part of the ‘streams’ or topics that the National Security Council (NSC) decided upon. These streams are:

• Our National Security Doctrine;
• Defence;
• Counter-terrorism;
• Cyber;
• Serious and organised and economic crime;
• Ports and borders;
• National resilience;
• Global Britain;
• National security strategic communications;
• Economic security, prosperity and trade;
• Development;
• Cross-government funds.

In the NSCR, these are again mentioned with the ‘Our National Security Doctrine’ stream replaced as the ‘Fusion Doctrine’ while the ‘Global Britain’ strand turned into the pledge that

We will strengthen our overseas network so that we can reinvest in our relationships around the world, champion the rules-based system including free trade and use our soft power to project our values and advance UK interests.

Out of all the streams, the Fusion Doctrine is perhaps the most prominent and most peculiar stream. Defence and national security  commentators have indeed made comments, mostly jovial about it. According to NSCR document, the Fusion Doctrine (I do not want to abbreviate it to FD) helps to further draw in NSC ministerial members to strength a collective approach towards the three NSC aims or priorities: 1) Protecting our [the UK] people; 2) Projecting our [the UK’s] influence [abroad] and 3) Promoting our [the UK’s] prosperity. It is based on a post-Chilchot inquiry approach, especially through the MOD-created document, The Good Operation. According to the NSCR, “Many capabilities that can contribute to national security lie outside traditional [British] national security departments” therefore there is the need to draw in all possible national security-related tools to bear.

The NSCR draws it up in this cute diagram:

NSCR Fusion Doctrine, MOD Crown Copyright

(PS I know the quality of the picture sucks, so go view it directly on p.10 of the NSCR document)

This Fusion Doctrine nevertheless brings up the question: Why form it when the UK’s NSC was formed back in 2010 for the same reason? This question was post to the National Security Adviser, currently Mark Sedwill by Defence Committee by MP Gavin Robinson. Sedwill replied that it is a “step forward” from the NSC “building on it” as the UK deals with more intensifying threats and address “modern deterrence” issued, however you define what that is. He goes on to give the example of the response to the Salisbury chemical attack to prove how the Fusion Doctrine was used–the response took place before the full investigation was completed and therefore it occurred at a faster pace and with stronger allied support. The Fusion Doctrine therefore dominates other parts of NSCR especially in the topics of ‘Economic Security, Prosperity and Trade’ and ‘Cross-Government Funds’ and will most definitely be the basis for future UK national security documents.

The other main part of the NSCR  talks about certain “cross-cutting issues”, namely, 1) Innovation: 2) Science & Technology; 3) Data; 4) Strategic Assessment and 5) Diversity. Basically, they (the NSC and NSA) wish to speed up the UK national security machinery in 1,2,3, harness the use of 5 and they claimed to have conducted a national security assessment, although that was not published in the NSCR but will be later in 2018 (p.20, paragraph 26. So that’s the main crux of the NSCR; the rest of it covers the other eleven streams stated above.

What is missing or what wrong with the NSCR?

As mentioned, the JCNSS report gave a very extensive evaluation of the NSCR, but it was published 11 days before the actual NSCR came out. I’ll try not use the same criticism the JCNSS used but rather choose four topics 1) criticism of the Fusion Doctrine (with reference to diagram above); 2) the lack of a review of the National Security Risk Assessment and 3) the fact that the NSCR is ‘fiscal neutral.

Criticism of the Fusion Doctrine (what that wheel all about?)

The Fusion  Doctrine puzzled many when the NSCR was published; some commentators online gave snide comments, others humorous. (You can check twitter or other social media platforms to find out.) On a more serious I too was puzzled and wondered the same questions that MP Gavin Robinson and the answers provided by Mark Sedwill hasn’t satisfied me. Surely there has been whole-of-government response during pre-NSCR periods? Global events and crises such as the 2011 Libya campaign, the wider Arab Spring, sectarian violence in Syria and Iraq, Russia’s illegal activities in Eastern Ukraine and annexation of Crimea all were approached via different UK government departments and organisations.

There has been joint up efforts by various departments such as through the CSSF and in fact, its predecessor, the Conflict Pool, was created long before the NSC or the Fusion Doctrine came about. The announcement of on this further joint-up approach towards any threat to the UK or national security issue doesn’t appear to a unique positive contribution. Using the examples of the Salisbury chemical attack and the US-UK-French strike on Syria, the joint-government department approach in both cases in my view is no different from pre-Fusion Doctrine approach. Sedwill mentioned they reacted faster in the case of the Salisbury attack–instead of waiting for a full investigation, they approached it by showing the Russian government what the cost of such an attack would be, ie, placing a wide range of Russian embassy staff on persona non grata. While this and the response to Assad’s chemical attack appears fine, responding quickly may give the impression that not all facts and avenues were scrutinised. This then could give an indication that the British government or its related agencies would be ignoring the Chilchot inquiry or the MOD’s The Good Operation document.

The most criticism on social media about the Fusion Doctrine is the ‘wheel’ diagram above, especially where the term ‘Armed Forces’ is located. Yes it is tucked at the ‘south east’ corner and appears to be the only defence-related tool there (Covert I guess is SIS/GCHQ/MI5 not exactly UK Special Forces). By placing the word ‘armed forces’ there amongst the many other tools, it appears that the Fusion Doctrine presents the British military as just a cog in a wheel and not a key voice or player.

This view or course is unwarranted since this is the National Security CR, not the military-only CR. Those who criticise that the military is sidelined, especially the House of Commons Defence Committee, journalists like Deborah Haynes all hold the biased kinked view that the NSCR should be solely or mainly about the MOD and the British Armed Forces. This view is quite outdated as inferred by Lord Ricketts in this oral evidence (More about the separation of defence from the NSCR later) and do no service to the whole concept of the UK’s NSC in the first place. What these critics do have a point is that the voice of the armed forces or the MOD needs to be heard when the NSC chooses what mix of tools to use. The MOD and the armed forces must have a strong equal say on the same level as the other list tools in that wheel, perhaps equal to key tools such as diplomacy, development and covert forces.

 The lack of a review of the National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA)

They say the NSCR is not a SDSR or a mini-SDSR but reviewing capabilities only. The JCNSS report specifically reported that the NSA told me the NSCR will not review the NRSA but there will be a review of the NRSA published in the later part of 2018 (see above). This is really out of place, especially since the NSCR was created due to the increasing or “intensifying” range of threats (mentioned prominently in the document) and that the NSCR occurred after the majority of British people voted to leave the European Union, the rise of an unpredictable Presidsent of the United States and the new non-state and state-based threats. The 2010 NRA, listed Tier One (most highly likely) threats as 1) International terrorism; 2) Hostile attacks upon UK cyber space; 3) A major accident or natural hazard which requires a national response and 4) International military crisis between states that require UK and allied response (see p27) (All these are not ranked in terms of likelihood, only just as Tier One.) In the 2015 NRSA, the same topics were noted as Tier One risks, with additional topics namely 5) Public health crisis and 6) Istability overseas (see p87). Yet, since SDSR 2015, UK officials and politicians increasingly saying that Russia and other nation states are becoming threats, see for example, Secret Intelligence Service Chief Younger’s speech, the Intelligence and Security Committee 2016 2017 report, sections on foreign countries, the speech given by General Sir Nicholas Carter at RUSI especially his video on Russian capabilities, CGHQ’s directors speech in April 2018, Gavin Williamson indicate than Russian is a bigger threat than terrorism, MI5’s Director General mentioning Russia as well in a recent speech and Chief of Defence Intelligence Osborn highlighting state-based threats. It is thus clear the current government views state-based threats as the biggest priority in Tier One, a clear topic not mentioned in in the previous NRSAs and only briefly stated in the  2016 Corporate Report, see page 6 paragraph 1.7. The NRSA review should therefore have been publish alongside the NSCR or in it rather than it pushed back to late 2018, where more different topics could be added to the Tier One list. A review on capabilities while perspectives on threats or actual threat is not really a review then.

The fact that the NSCR is ‘fiscal neutral’ or ‘fiscally neutral’

I’ve actually never heard the term ‘fiscal neutral’ or ‘fiscally neutral’ before but let’s use it anyway. The ‘criticism’ levelled by many parliamentarians (mainly from the House of Commons), the media (mainly Deborah Haynes from The Times and other defence journalists from other news papers), is the the NSCR’s (including the area of defence) woes could be simply solved by adding more money or pounds to the MOD’s budget. The blame, and I said it is a common and easy target to blame, lies exactly Treasury here. This can be seen in the follow parliamentary debates such as the introduction of the MDP, an emergency question on the MDP by Dr Lewis and the Lords debate about the MDP. Parliamentarians and commentators basically say, naughty Treasury, you aren’t giving enough to a department which protects the nation.

Let me focus on the on the NSCR, minus the area of defence (which I’ll cover separately when the MDP comes out). It is yes incorrect to call it a review when it shows just how there would be more joint-up approach and a sweeping ‘yes we will do this’ list. It is even more astonishing that the review was conducted due to not so-called, but actual new or evolving threats to the UK without any possible financial increase to sharpen non-military UK defence. The 2015 SDSR did say the intelligence services account and personnel, but there has been no indication on that aim, inasmuch the intelligence services need to be covered by a blanket of secrecy. Other UK departments like the Home Department or even like DEFRA (Climate Change is an ever evolving threat). UK national security does require more than one hard or soft power tool or department or institution, and if the threats change, the departments and institutions cannot always address the threat if constrained by a financial box. A clear example is the newest Home Secretary calling for more finances for the police. Of course, this cry comes after the NSCR, but is a relevant example on its failure for boxing in finances of these national security-linked agencies.

This ‘fiscal neutral’ condition draws in more critics, especially those cheering solely for the MOD and/or the British Armed Forces. This lot of people see the ‘fiscal neutral’ condition as an extension of the British government (whether Conservative or Labour) act not to place the MOD in charge of defence reviews except in 1991 or place defence first. It brings up the argument that British national security is best or only handled by the MOD and no away should HM Treasury or the Cabinet Office constrain defence spending. More about that in the post on the MDP.

Conclusion

The NSCR came out quite late and without a parliamentary debate, though perhaps that wouldn’t have produced constructive critique, given the natural of Her Majesty’s opposition. It is claimed as a review, but largely contributes just a new, or rather updated concept of further joining up UK national security-related departments, agencies and tools, so that response to crises or harmful scenarios will be in one united and perhaps a more forceful response. The remainder of the NSCR does not really review but provides an multitude of pledges. Here, I tried to explain and critique the Fusion Doctrine and criticise the lack of a proper risk assessment and the failure to consider more financial funding despite the NSCR claiming that threats to the UK have ‘intensified’ or increased. As I have mentioned, there’s a more and better comprehensive critique found in the JCNSS report, even though it was published before the NSCR.

Does the UK need a Designated Survivor?

tweet by Larissa Brown, the defence editor/journalist from the Daily Mail, started of a serious and playful discussion, with other like-minded journalists thinking they could be Designated Survivors. But seriously, does the UK need a Designated Survivor?

What is a Designated Survivor (DS)?

Mr Wikipedia and Mr Google have lots of information, sometimes exaggerated or inaccurate on this phrase. Anyway, such a term or individual arises in the United States, most notably during the State of the Union Address or a full joint session of Congress and all senior US Government officials including the President of the United States (POTUS). One cabinet member, usually one with a low/minority post and a ‘true-blue’ Presidential Candidate individual–that is, above 35 and USA born–will not attend the glorious session but be kept in an unknown bunker, with a host of Secret Service Agents and a copy of the nuclear football. Should, God forbid, POTUS and or the Congress be killed by a nuclear warhead or warheads or terrorist bomb or end of the world device, this individual will be the acting POTUS. The US of A still has a leader. See this news article for instance and the list of US Cabinet Secretaries who failed to attend the State of the Union Address.

How about the British Context?

A general answer is no, from quick checks, there is no DS equivalent for major UK events, say the State Opening of Parliament. However, in the above twitter thread, this tweet answered that the “Vice Chamberlain of the Household …is the parliamentary ‘hostage’ for the State Opening of Parliament”. Ok yes, by convention, the Vice Chamberlain of the Household, who is is a senior whip, is held captive in Buckingham Palace, that is, he or she does not attending the event. But, there is no clear suggestion that the Vice Chamberlain of the Household will assume the role of acting Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, should the presiding Prime Minister, again God forbid, be incapacitated or killed out right during this event or other major events. My good contact, @TheSecurocrat provided his view here, which may be a closer answer but still leaves the debate open.

Back to the question: Isn’t this a worry for the British leadership?

Yes, some may say. Tensions are high right now, threats are coming from Russia, global terrorism and other areas of extremism. The current threat level, as of this post on 21/4/2018, is severe, one level before there is an imminent attack. Should there really be an attack on the senior leadership of the UK, who will replace the PM immediately? Who would advise on leading the country or even detail a retaliation against adversary, perhaps even ordering a SLBM strike from the SSBN on patrol?

The answer, even before the UK gained a nuclear power, is, we don’t know for certain. The UK does not have a fixed constitution like other countries, rather, it is an ‘ uncodified constitution’. The reigning monarch, will ask the winning leader from the British General Election to form a government and that leader becomes the Prime Minister. There is no set deputy or vice to Prime Minister of the day. The 2011 Cabinet Manual, specifically paragraph 3.11, states:

The title of Deputy Prime Minister [DPM] is sometimes given to a senior minister in the Government, for example the deputy leader of the party in government or the leader of the smaller party in a coalition. The role of the Deputy Prime Minister is sometimes combined with other roles, but responsibilities will vary according to the circumstances….The fact that a person has the title of Deputy Prime Minister does not constrain the Sovereign’s power to appoint a successor to a Prime Minister.

The first and last line assets that a) there is no compulsory position for a UK DPM for any PM and b) the Sovereign appoints the next UK Prime Minster and all Prime Ministers even if there is a DPM. The again is the same for the ‘senior’ position of First Secretary of State (Cabinet Manual, 3.12). In the US, it is clear that if the POTUS is impeached, ill, or has passed away, the Vice President assumes his position or in the case of the major events, the DS. This naturally leads to critics wondering again: Should the PM be unfit (eg be medically ill or sick) or really murdered, who will take his or her place? The PM after all, directs the nation, the UK’s position globally, and especially the armed forces. Well, looking down in the history of British PMs, some had Deputy Prime Ministers like Churchill, Atlee, Eden, Macmillian, Thatcher, Major, Blair and of course, Cameron, naturally appointed a DPM from another political party given his coalition government. Macmillian, Wilson, Major, Blair, Brown and Cameron all also had First Secretaries of State, many of these were also DPMs before. For PMs without a clear DPM or First Secretary of State, they do still have a designated ‘deputy’, who appears prominently during Prime Ministers Questions when their boss is away. For example, Harriet Harman deputised for Gordon Brown in March 2009. In the case where there’s no clear deputy mentioned by the PM or found by the media, the deputy is usually the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

But really, does the UK need to copy the US and have a Designated Survivor during major events? One must realise that the DS in the US (and maybe in Russia and in China) isn’t just the leader-in-waiting during high-profile events, but part of the wider US Continuity of Government (COG) plan. This link gives a very detailed description of COG and COG is used almost daily, especially when the POTUS travels abroad. A US DS, as mentioned above, will be next to the nuclear football, formally known as the Presidential Emergency Satchel. He or she will be explained by the Football Carrier and possibly nearby senior military officers, the evacuation procedures and quite possibly, the range of targets for a nuclear attack or counterattack using ICBMs, SLBMs, B-2, B-52 bombers and in the future, B-21s. He or she will direct US Armed Forces, the US finances and the the whole might of the US nation after the elected POTUS. This is so because the US, whatever crises or wars it has been through, is still a reigning superpower and COG allows such power to be maintained and therefore a DS plays a crucial part in it.

What about the UK? The UK is not a mighty superpower it once was but is a P5 member on the UN Security Council, a leading member of the World Bank and the IMF, the G7.8/20 and so on. Yet, it nothing on the scale of the US, Russia or China, even as it should not falter in its efforts of being a major power. What I mean is, the UK does not, inasmuch as it tries, match might of the US of A. It does not have a nuclear triad like the US, Russia or China, and therefore there officially does not exist a UK equivalent of the nuclear football for any UK PM. The UK doesn’t have the range of conventional and strategic command and control a US POTUS or DS has or will have respectively. I mean, there is no UK equivalent of the E-6 Mercury or E-4 E4 Advanced Airborne Command Post for the  UK PM. The British PM does not even have a dedicated Air Force One like a POTUS has–don’t try to argue that the Cam or May Force One is the same as the VC-25s!

So really, the DS is not about one person but a range of assurances that yes, whatever happens to the US, there will always be a POTUS for the US of A. For the UK, its government, military/defence, economic and position it not near the size of US to warrant a constant COG. Yes, US COG doesn’t just happen at certain times but 24/7. The POTUS always has nuclear football near here 24/7/365, and people in the US line of succession are always kept in the loop. The UK, in contrast, again has a different and smaller range of leadership and global position and does not have a need for a person to standby to be PM. Having a DS or fixed individual ready to be PM would be not just a political waste, but a financial waste–the maintenance of a the US CG and DS must be really expensive and such expenditure would be better allocated to other areas of UK security. Furthermore, to create a UK DS or fixed deputy or vice PM, it would change the UK’s relationship with other major global powers and even increase the security threats to the UK. In the case of the US, because of its nuclear triad and range of powers, it can maintain a COG and a DS as it does not really change the threat levels towards the US. (This I know is debatable but I’ll leave it here.)

COG and DS usage in reality and well fiction

But, critics cry again, there have been times the UK and US leadership has been threaten and several US Presidents have been assassinated, most famously John F Kennedy. Recent files showed that the Soviets feared a random US General might have launched a nuclear strike on the Soviet Union immediately after his death. COG was more recently used in the September 11 attacks. Richard Clarke, the then National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counter-terrorism, initiated COG, which resulted in the then Speaker of the House, Denis Hastert, evacuated to a secure location and other Cabinet officials moved to alternative sites. (Read Clarke R. A, 2004, Against all Enemies, The Free Press, paperback version pp.7-9). Most recently, in fiction, Tom Kirkman, played by actor Kiefer Sutherland, was elevated from Secretary of Housing and Urban Development to POTUS due to an (spoilers!) American terrorist attack during the State of the Union address. If the ‘leader of the Free World’ can be threatened or killed, what about the UK PM?

A Designated Survivor in fiction: Tom Kirkman (Kiefer Sutherland) as the sudden President of the United States. This is most definitely the TV series Brown was watching and therefore tweeted about it. (All copyright is own by ABC).

On the UK end, luckily and maybe unluckily, there was only one British PM, Spencer Perceval who was assassinated in office. More well-known attempts on British PMs were the IRA attacks on the 1984 Conservative Party Conference in Brighton and the 1991 IRA mortar on 10 Downing Street. I don’t think Perceval had a deputy then or there was really need for the British leadership then to have a DS. Margaret Thatcher most certainly had a deputy, but it was not sure if she had a DS but most probably had a UK type of COG  during her Premiership. (I’m sure there are historians who know more about UK government protective procedures during the Cold War days since I’m not an expert on this.)

Much more recently, after the Cold War, after the September 11 attacks, after the 2003 Iraq War, yes, there was an attempt to structure the British Cabinet and parliament so that there would be a line of succession after the PM. This award goes to Peter Bone, MP for Wellingborough, who wondered what would happen if the then Prime Minister, David Cameron would be incapacitated or killed. Would Nick Clegg, the then Deputy Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, the Liberal Democrat leader, take over the coalition government which was Conservative Party-led? Drop your “morbid fascination” was the parliamentary reply from Clegg and the then PM. Cameron also added, “[a]ll I can say is that I have no plans to be incapacitated.” Bone still was undeterred and proposed this Prime Minister (Replacement) bill two years later, structuring who would be Prime Minister should the sitting PM be incapacitated or killed. You can review a debate of the bill here. Thankfully, Mr Cameron never got injured (only struck by a jogger) or killed in office. Bone continued to raise this issue with David Cameron again in September 2015 who would replace him if he was was killed. No answer. At present, Bone is still a MP today and still has this bill in mind as of 5 September 2017. One wonders if he will ask Theresa May the same question, give that she has not appointed a DPM or First Secretary of State after Damian Green resigned.

So that’s the recent history of attempts on the lives the British PM. There’s no fictional TV series or movie about British Designated Survivors (I could be wrong though). Do we still worry who will be in charge should there be a disaster or a London has fallen event? (I actually hate that movie by the way.) After 2010, there was the creation of the UK National Security Council which is ministers-staff and has sub-committees on threats and emergency procedures, so that all Ministers work in coordination and known what to do in the event of emergencies. But who does the rest of the wider UK government and armed forces trust during a huge disaster/strike?

In the 1997 action movie Air Force One, the Vice President asks: Who do they [people on Air Force One] trust up there? Who do we trust? (Picture copyright by Columbia Pictures)

Conclusion

A UK-style Designated Survivor for large important events such as the State Opening of Parliament or major events may be relevant. Yet, the UK’s military, economic and political in the the world is not the same as the US of A, and one must remember the Designated Survivor is a position within the wider scope of the constant US Continuity of Government. The UK may have its own version COG, but keeping a DS for events will be costly and quite frankly not needed. Across the UK’s parliamentary and Prime Minister’s history, it has survived through not just State Opening of Parliaments, but two World Wars and a range of other crises. Get a fixed deputy in charge? No,the Prime Minister of the day is decided and appointed by his or her Majesty.

Mr Peter Bone’s queries and plan, as thoughtful and relevant as it is, was more to ensure that no one individual who is not related to the Conservative Party replaces Cameron or May, not so much caring for a true UK-style Designated Survivor. The British Armed Forces, inasmuch as it is under civilian control, looks to the Sovereign of the day as their Commander-in-Chief. In the case of any crisis or emergency, I am sure all participants, from the military to down to the person in the street, will have a PM or leader in charge. Perhaps one day, there will be a changed role for the UK globally and thus a constitutional change that requires an awaiting person to be PM if and if the Prime Minister is insane, injured or killed. As of British political history and now, there is just no need for a Designated Survivor or a US-style Continuity of Government.

Army 2020 Refine: My views

In Part One, I listed out the structural changes or unit changes that are occurring under the Army 2020 Refine plan. In this part, I give my perspectives on the changes in the whole Army 2020 Refine plan and how it might affect the British Army or HM Armed Forces as a hole.

1) Army 2020 Refine, however it is phrased, is about cost-cutting and efficiency. They claim that “continue to sustain a regular Army of 82,000, a whole force of 112,000 regular and reserve troops” and that “existing regimental cap badges will be retained”. Yet, it is a distinct fact that units “rationalised” means units cut and a limitation in power projection. This plan may not be as harsh as the retrenchments during SDSR 2010 and the original Army 2020 plan, but still further reduces the overall combat scope of the British Army. Of course, such personnel shifts and unit disbanding could be said to be due to recruitment challenges as a result of either system problems or low morale. Whatever the reason, it should be stated publicly that Army 2020 Refine plan is about cutting and reducing firepower, inasmuch as that would generate constant criticism. Politicians and leaders should definitely not hide behind the usual soundbites.

2) This smaller-sized British Army is reflected through the placing of the bulk of British army units in 3rd Division or what they call the Reaction Force. The original Army 2020 plane separately out the only two British Army Divisions–3rd Division as the Reaction Force and 1st Division as the Adaptable Force. Despite 3rd Division being the division that could conduction major land warfare, 1st Division’s structure could still be argued to be worthy as a ‘warfighting’ division, with of course from Force Troops Command (FTC). Under Army 2020 Refine, 102nd Logistic Brigade disbands and several Army Reserve units and regular army units get transferred over to 3rd Division, essentially removing 1st Division’s CS and CSS capability and reducing it to a hodge-podge of units only for commitments other than war. Even if deployed as a whole, which is highly unlikely, 1st Division would not be able to successfully contain a given area without assistance from 3rd Division or allied support. This risky move of really place all units in one basket, that is, 3rd Division, negatively affects the image of the British Army as a whole.

Army 2020 Refine indicates that even with “a whole force of 112,000 regular and reserve troops”, the UK can only produce one division-sized unit for defence or external operations, whether just British or allied operations, especially if allocated to the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC). Second, it means the British Army can only sustain this size for a shorter period of time than say under the original Army 2020 plan, possibly complicating operations as a whole. It further will cause criticism on social media, the wider mainstream media and the British people when they realise that the mighty British Army, after Brexit, and facing what are deemed as state-based threats, is fighting with just one division-sized force.

3) Army 2020 Refine places too much hope/trust on the Ajax vehicle, once titled Scout SV. This vehicle has its origins from the Future Rapid Effects System programme and in turn the whole search for British Army medium weight capability. There has been much criticism and praise over the Ajax by commentators such as Think Defence so I shan’t repeat it over here. What I’m pointing towards the the constant praise by senior military figures like CGS or UK politicians over this vehicle–see for example how many times the Ajax vehicle was hailed by UK parliamentarians or the constant emphasis on AJAX by CGS in this . It does have its strengths over veteran British Army tracked vehicles, but as defence commentators point out, placing it as a ‘medium tank’ and as a tracked vehicle mixed with the wheeled MIV (now revealed as Boxer) isn’t a wise decision. Senior figures should realise one new vehicle is not the golden rod or mighty sword for the future British Army.

4) The new Reaction Force design also places much emphasis on the Strike Brigade concept. Beyond the problems of mixing tracked and wheeled vehicles, the exact question is more about full potential or firepower of this brigade. For starters, as pointed out above, the Ajax vehicle, armed at best with a 40mm cannon, cannot really be act as a ‘medium tank’. At best yes, it can counter light to somewhat medium armoured vehicles but not high-end adversaries, definitely not the Armata MBT and its associated vehicles. As noted in my earlier entry, the CS and CSS areas of the Strike Brigade are still missing, placing the exact effectiveness of the brigade or brigades in doubt.

A distinct example is the grouping of all the GMLRS batteries in 26 RA under Army 2020 Refine. This may be similar to the US Army’s Field Artillery Brigades (formerly Fires Brigades), but more importantly, there is a lack clarity what future vehicle would replace the M270. Also, 26 RA in the future will provide fire support for both the Armoured Infantry (AI) brigades and the Strike brigades. In that case, will it have all tracked rocket batteries, all wheeled rocket batteries or half wheeled and half tracked units? Will the MOD purchase the M142 HIMARS as a possible replacement? Recently, 38 (Seringapatam) Battery, a TAC battery under 19 RA disbanded. With TAC batteries disappearing across all the key CS RA regiments, how can 1st Artillery Brigade successfully provide fire support to the two types of brigades in 3rd Division? Also, what sort of engineering vehicles will support the Strike Brigades? Will they continue to use the current range of Royal Engineers and Argus, the Engineering variant of Ajax, or will there a wheeled engineering variant from the MIV?

5) Following suit, the focus on creating Strike Brigades indicates that two remaining Armoured Infantry (AI) brigades will lose their organic reconnaissance battalions/regiments; all the Scimitar-to-Ajax regiments get transferred over to the Strike Brigades. Don’t start crying yet as there still might be Ajax reece vehicles left in the AI brigades–there might be some Ajax vehicles in the Challenger 2 Regiment Command and Reconnaissance squadrons and similarly in the recce troops in the four remaining Warrior AI regiments. However, it extremely daring for the Army 2020 Refine planners to remove the organic reconnaissance regiment from the AI brigades. This naturally means almost no dedicated scouting units at the brigade-level, reducing the commander’s intelligence ability in the field. Oh yeah, they will say that British forces would harness the use of allied reconnaissance units during operations. However, it is definitely more reassuring for AI brigades to operate with their own dedicated scouting unit rather than depend on allied support which still may be alien to them, despite years  of interoperability. There may be some method in their madness in this planning, that is, just depending on squadron or troop-level scouting units, but it is clearly not stated on paper. Perhaps the AI Brigades will ‘share’ the reconnaissance regiment/battalion from the Strike Brigade but that again is a big question mark. What have the planners actually devised?

6) Back to the Strike Brigade: Another novel idea for the Strike Brigades is for two RLC brigades to merge with two REME brigades to provide a mega CSS brigade. This is clearly a move to reduce costs and/or improve efficiency despite all the claims it helps meet the rapid deployment of the Strike Brigades. The first major question is how exactly will it be structured given that (supposedly) no cap badges will be lost? Second, there are undoubtedly be two Lieutenant Colonels in each RLC and REME unit–will both act as co-commanders or will one lose his post? Third, how will the sub-units within this merged unit appear like? Will some sub-units disband as a result?

7) The removal or disbanding of 32 Regiment Royal Artillery means that the whole of Field Army (funky name for a small one warfighting division force) will lose a short to medium range UAV for ISTAR capability. This is extremely damaging especially since they removed the platoon-level Black Hornet from service in 2017. Once again, this disbanding could be attributed to low recruitment and troop retention levels in this regiment, but you don’t throw away a good axe just because you can’t sharpen it well. A Janes report said they are looking for a replacement for Desert Hawk III but that is not a confirmation there will actually be a replacement. Therefore, the British Army or what they term as ‘Joint Force 2025’ will be stuck with Reaper, later Protector and the the much-delayed Watchkeeper as Unmanned ISTAR in the future. Update: Protector’s in-service date has also been pushed back to 2024. Yours truly made a FOI request and learnt that they have not decided if the batteries in 32 RA will actually disband/placed in suspended animation. This still does not provide any comfort that there will be an organic medium-range UAV capability at all. Yours truly also asked about the personnel strength and established strength of 32 RA before Army 2020 Refine was announced. The answer was 509 for the former and 550 for the later. This doesn’t really suggest that 32 RA was slated to disband because of low personnel recruitment. In any case, the loss or impending loss is definitely a big worry, again indicating that Army 2020 Refine reduces the capability of the future British Army.

8) Before Army 2020 Refine, there were several equipment projects run by Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S)  that were aimed to create a more lethal British Army. As in the case of many big corporations, there are always ineffective and delayed projects. Unlike such corporations, such delayed projects do cause massive worry amongst defence analysts and commentators likely yours truly and should worry senior military leaders and politicians. A core example is the Warrior Capability Sustainment Project (WCSP) which has been marked Amber/Red in the
latest Major Project Portfolio Data Report. WCSP is critical for the two future AI brigades but its delay or constant delays could mean the two AI brigades would operation 1980s-type Warrior vehicles well into the middle of the 21st Century. The Major Project Portfolio Data Report also indicate that the Armoured Battlefield Support Vehicle (ABSV) was removed from the WCSP. ABSV is crucial vehicle–basically a turretless Warrior that would serve as a mortar-carrying vehicle replacing the FV430 Mk3 Bulldog and a medical variant for the remaining two armoured medical regiments as well as perform other support roles–think something like the US Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle. This removal of the ABSV (also see the difference in the 2015 and 2016 Defence Equipment Plans) opens queries about the fire support or medical evacuation for the two remaining AI brigades. The last known information is that Bulldog has an out of service date of 2030. Surely the British Army isn’t going to stick with a nearly fifty year old vehicle into any future operation?

9) From the rise of Strike Brigades, gutted AI brigades and equipment delays, there is also the question about the simple structure of the Field Army (again a terrible name for a small force). What has not widely broadcast since 2015 is that 42nd Infantry Brigade is no longer a brigade but a Regional Point of Command (RPoC) under British Army Regional Command (the brigade was ‘removed’ in around late 2017). The full name is simply Headquarters Northwest (all this information is via a FOI again). That thus reduces the number of brigades under 1 Division by one, leaving 4th 7th, 11th, 38th, 51st and 160th Infantry Brigades. Yet, they want to have two Strike Brigades, meaning they have to ‘move’ a HQ from 1st Division into 3rd Division. That would leave 1st Division with only five brigades. At the same time, they want a Specialised Infantry Group–that is currently command by a 1-star officer according to Gulabin. So what will be the formal title of the second Strike Brigade and/or Strike Experimentation Brigade and how many brigades will there actually be in 1st Division? Update: the question is partly answered here but if 4th Brigade remains in 1st Division, then a new brigade name must be allocated to the second strike brigade.

10) Re the Specialised Infantry Battalions/Group: This is a really novel idea, which eases the burden of regular British Armed Forces units from training other weak militaries (or may not since). The SIG/SIB isn’t just a British Army concept; the US Army for example has its Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFAB) and aims to create six such SFABs. The first main problem, however, is that creating SIBs for the British Army or 1st Division or the Adaptable Force further reduces the number of active regular infantry units. Look at the image below:

Army 2020 Refine Regular Infantry Units

(Take from The Rifles twitter account)

The number of armoured infantry (Warrior) units have been reduced to 4 (originally 6 under the original Army 2020, the MIV units increase from 3 to 4, the Light Protected Mobility concept has been removed, and crucially, the number of light infantry units decrease by 4 (not counting the air assault infantry but including the Gurkha Rifles regiments). This means 1) there won’t be enough light infantry units to sustain a major COIN conflict like OP HERRICK, 2) there will be a smaller pool of infantry soldiers to choose from for the Special Air Service and 3) again, the lethality of 1st Division has diminished. This re-structuring might improve recruitment for the specific regiments that produce the SIBs, namely: The Rifles, The Royal Regiment of Scotland, the Princes of Wales Royal Regiment and the Duke of Lancaster’s Regiment. This however is not certain.The second problem is how effective the SIB/SIGs will actually be in training foreign armies. In my view, these defence engaging units should no just be infantry units but a host of infantry, signals, engineers and other CS units so that the armed forces targeted are not just trained in simple infantry.

11) As noted in my previous article, there are no more Light Protected Mobility Regiments; instead infantry regiments on operations will receive the Foxhound and perhaps the MRV-P Group 2 vehicle only if necessary. Again, this is for the increasing efficiency and save up money. It is not exactly a wise move, as it means all the light infantry units will have to be trained to operate the Foxhound/MRV-P. Perhaps there will be massive training for all but that would result in a) shifting personnel to a particular training ground b) spending more money that was otherwise allocated for saving. Also, if any light infantry regiment/battalion can be allocated such a vehicle, are there enough drivers in each battalion? I made a FOI request (yes, you can see that I love sending FOIs) and got the answer that a light infantry unit under Army 2020 Refine will have a strength of 628 soldiers, not including attached personnel. Will these battalions gain attached drivers (likely from the RLC) or will the drivers come from amongst the 628 soldiers?

12) Again, due to the “piling” of CS, CSS and Army Reserve units in 3rd Division, 1st Division is ’emptied out’, with basically scattered light cavalry and light infantry units. This was already the case in Army 2020, and Army 2020 Refine hasn’t improved the sub-unit structure at all. As before, the majority of light cavalry and light infantry units are located in 4th, 7th and 51st brigades, while the others are just scattered in the remaining brigades. With the ‘demise’ of 42nd Infantry Brigade, this again really means 1st Division is constrained in fielding whole brigades for operations, even simple peacekeeping or HADR. My suggestions on how to re-structure 1st Division can be seen below.

13) There are many excellent qualities of the Wildcat AH1 reconnaissance helicopter but there can be much more for it in terms in firepower. It’s naval counterpart will be armed with two missile variants: the Future Anti-Surface Guided Weapon (Light) FASGW(L) or what they call the Lightweight Multirole Missile (LMM) or Martlet and the Future Anti-Surface Guided Weapon (Heavy) FASGW(H) or Sea Venom. If you look at Think Defence’s article, LMM does have a ground-launch capability and can penetrate extremely-light armoured vehicles and useful to take out buildings. As I see it, the British Army could expand the Wildcat AH1’s capabilties by including a missile launcher and similar load of LMMs as with the naval variant, the Wildcat HMA2. They must work with DE&S and DSTL to re-structure the LMM into an air-to-ground missile. This would provide some form of additional strike capability for the Army Air Corps, freeing up the 50 Apache Es on actual anti-armour duty. LMM might even be a future air-to-air missile to shoot down UAVs but give the Wildcat some missile capability first.

14) 16 Air Assault Brigade (16 AA) comes under Commander Field Army’s operational control now and there was no actual specific mention of it in Army 2020 Refine, well indirectly we know that 21 (Gibraltar 1779-83) Air Assault Battery might disband, leaving 16 AA with out a reconnaissance UAV. 16 AA seems to be partnering with allied forces since 2010, namely from across the pond and across the English Channel. This partnership could be expanded. Suggestions for 16 AA detailed below.

15) The whole set of senior officers for a future army aimed at 82,000 soldiers is still too many. I do not subscribe to Andrew Mark Dorman’s weird idea of putting Captains instead of Majors in charge of Rifle Companies, but seriously, even post-Levene, more reforms are needed to balance the number of high-ranking officers and British Army positions.

My recommendations for Army 2020 Refine and the Modernising Defence Programme:

A big note: As you might gather, besides listing the Orbats of the three main services, I don’t like to play the role of a ‘keyboard warrior’, inasmuch as I’m a junior defence commentators. I know some defence commentators are such as have fantasy ideas of what the British Army and Armed Forces should look like but I’m not like them. I a good spirit, I shan’t name them but you can problem guess who. Anyway, here are my not-play-fantasy-fleet (or should it be army?) recommendations and I should also say I submitted these to the Modernising Defence Programme consultation.

1. The Army 2020 Refine plan/exercise is about cutting the size of the Army and the government should be clear about this. The original Army 2020 plan was much better in terms of structure and lethality.
2. Even if the MOD/British Army wishes to place the bulk of units in 3rd Division, it should not just have a single warfighting division. This is quite insulting for the UK as a NATO member and one claiming to have a very close relationship with the US.
3. 1st Division should still be classified as a warfighting division, with 3 RHA and 4 RA still tasked to support 1st Division brigades (when not supporting the Strike Brigades). Ideally, 1st Division should re-structure to have 2 to 3 infantry brigades with 1 x light cavalry regiment and 2 x light infantry battalions, both with paired Army Reserve units. The remaining infantry brigades should contain 2 x light infantry units, again paired with Army Reserve infantry regiments, all trained in helicopter airborne assault. Army Reserve engineers and signals units, even though allocated to 101 or 104 Logistic Brigades, should be tasked to 1st Division to provide it with credible CSS support. 1st Division HQ should also be deployable for Peacekeeping or COIN missions, as was the case for HQ 6th Division during the Afghanistan campaign.
4. There needs to be a wider top-level restructuring. The role of a Deputy CGS is questionable and possibly unnecessary as it keeps a separate 3* in Army HQ with no clear counterpart in the Royal Navy or RAF. Merge this role with, for example, Commander Home Command to cut down senior officers and actually save money.
5. Commander Home Command as a 3* is too high a rank for the Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA) commander. Give this position to Commander Regional Command and slowly merge the roles of Home Command with Regional Command to cut the number of high-ranking positions.
6. Similarly, HQ London District has a 2* and 1* mainly for ceremonial roles. This is what maybe be termed as a ‘ sacred cow ‘ that need to be changed. HQ London District could be more financed by non-MOD funding such ass from Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) or the Cabinet Office rather than the pressured Defence Budget. The number of ceremonial units should be reduced in HQ London District and it should be turned into a deployable unit to support 16 Air Assault Brigade or the Lead Armoured Battle Group.
7. Merge or restructre the Army Personnel Centre, the Sandhurst Group and the Army Training and Recruiting Division. This helps to reduce the number of 2*s.
8. The British Army might want to revamp the Other Ranks structure so senior WO1s have a distinction in terms of responsibility.
9. I see nothing wrong with Majors commanding company-level troops but more Captains in CS and CSS units.
10. As with the Royal Navy, it is extremely essential to close the gap between equipment that will go out of service (OSD) and their replacements. Some UORs brought into the core budget still do have capability such as Panther Command and Liaison Vehicle and the Mastiff variants. This doesn’t mean they should be kept for a longer period but they can be retained perhaps for the Army Reserve units.
11. On this point, paired Regular-Army reserve units must have similar equipment, especially those allocated to 3rd Division. It is not right to have Army Reserve units without, for example, Warrior APCs or Artillery and only allocated them when on operations.
12. Some Army/Land projects are stalled or falling behind schedule, for example, the Warrior CSP and the Watchkeeper UAV. It may be time to consider alternatives than may not be cheaper or are cheaper. The UK cannot afford to have an outdated force.
13. The British Army should rethink the positioning and role of the Ajax vehicle as a medium tank, especially since it means mixing tracked vehicles (Ajax) with wheeled vehicles (MIV). Ajax should just revert to the role of reconnaissance and a separate vehicle (MIV variant) used as anti-armour/quick strike.
14. MIV variants (now Boxer) should include mortar (a wheeled variant of the Bulldog armoured vehicle), anti-tank/ATGM, HMG, CBRN (for Falcon Squadron), anti-aircraft (replacement for Stormer). The Strike Brigade MIV battalions should not use MRV-P for these roles, especially mortar. Mortars must be able to be fired on the move.
15. The Army should rethink the 2 x Armoured Infantry Brigades and 2 Strike Brigades concept. Even in the 2003 Gulf War, it had a better structure of heavy and light tracked vehicles. I suggest reverting to all tracked vehicles for 3rd Division, 3 battlegroup-sized units and allocate the Strike Brigades and MRV-Ps to 1st Division to have all wheeled battalions/battlegroups there.
16. 16 Air Assault Brigade should ready 2, not just 1 x air assault and parachute-capable companies on stand-by. They should expand the P Company parachute course.
17. The Army must increase its size. Possible quick areas to increase personnel numbers include bringing back 42nd Infantry Brigade (while cutting 2* and 3* posts) and by changing 5 SCOTs from a ceremonial company into a mixed Regular-Reserve Battalion.
18. There are far too small number of infantry regiments, cut further by Army 2020 Refine. The Specialised Infantry Group is a great idea, but it should not be just for the infantry, which is heavily-tasked. Instead, a mixed force of infantry, engineers, signal and other CS personnel should for a Specialised Unit to train other militaries.
19. Section sizes in the future should be a minimum of 7 or best 8. A section size of 6 is far too small.

Army 2020 Refine was largely General Nick Carter ‘s idea, constrained by SDSR 2010 and SDSR 2015. Now that he will be CDS, it will likely carry on, unless the new CGS, who we do not know who as yet, has the courage and refine it (but don’t call it Army 2020 Refine Refine or Refine 2.0) to better structure the small/82,000 (or less) British Army to meet today’s and tomorrows threats.

The National Security Capability Review, the Modernising Defence Programme: Common accusations

The UK since July 2017, has been conducting a National Security Capability Review or NSCRS. In brief, is a short revision of the 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), shaping this SDSR under the era of Brexit and new security threats. The 2015 SDSR was cheered by military people and defence commentators, however, the NSCR is getting constant criticism by this same group of individuals. The NSCR is viewed as a means to cut the defence budget and reduce the power of the British Armed Forces. Last week, on 25 January 2018, Secretary of State for Defence Gavin Williamson offered a sub-review within the NSCR, titled a Modernising Defence Programme (MDP) as a means to placate these critical commentators. As the debates and criticisms drawn on over both reviews, out appear three common accusations.

The very first accusation and often heard of is the ‘blame DFID, it takes away money for the MOD’. Post 2010, the Department for International Development (DFID) aid, or officially Official Development Assistance (ODA), was ringfenced at 0.7% of UK GDP and then enshrined into law in 2015. This has caused much dissent amongst the media and commentators, who view DFID as a government department sucking away money that could rather be given to the MOD and the British Armed Forces. The reason for any decrease in UK military expenditure is often attributed to DFID and high UK aid levels.

The second, and this more relating to SDSR 2015, is placing the blame on individuals or organisations for not funding the forces. There the ‘blame HM Treasury review, MOD doesn’t get enough money’ accusation. This was often mentioned and brought up in a recent Defence Committee hearing.[1] Such an accusation may be separate or linked to the above review regarding DFID. If HMT Treasury as a whole doesn’t get the blame, it is the Chancellor of the Exchequer who gets the blame; he is said to have little care for funding the armed forces. Another individual who is recently targeted for all the ‘low’ defence spending is the British National Security Adviser (NSA). In the Defence Committee hearing mentioned above, the questions appear to indicate that either the NSA has little appreciation for the MOD and the armed services, or that SDSRs should be mainly MOD-led and not by some civil servant who has never served a day in combat.

The third sort of accusation or rather belief, as just mentioned, is that defence reviews or SDSRs should be mainly about the British military and the MOD. An example is from this Telegraph article which asserts that the NSA is aiming to place more funding towards the intelligence and security services and away from the armed forces.[2] Another Telegraph article quotes the Chair the Defence Committee, who is relieved that the formation of MDP means a review lead by the Defence Secretary.[3] Clearly to such pundits, any defence review equals to a review about the armed forces, and that’s final.

All this of this accusation must come to a halt. First, regarding the accusation that HM Treasury or the Chancellor is not caring about defence. It is certainly not the case there there’s this evil organisation or politician, snatching money from the MOD and channelling to some other department. There certainly are threats facing the UK, directly and indirectly, and a good number of them can be addressed by strong armed forces. It, however, doesn’t mean, that you should spend to excess on the military with no regard for the economy.[4]

Second, it should be clear that ‘defence of the realm’ today, or even in the past, cannot just be addressed through large navies, massive armies and swarming planes. Intelligence, cyber defences, and well UK assistance for development do help address military and other security threats alone. If the MOD or defence ministers lead SDSRs or defence reviews, such reviews might even reduce the funding and role of UK intelligence services and weaken UK response and defences. The NSA may be a career civil servant and not always have a military or security background. Even with such lack of experience, he should not be characterised as one with no care for armed forces. It is right to critically analyse his performance, but not to accuse him because of individual beliefs.

The case of DFID and UK aid is slightly more controversial. I do disagree with a parliamentary law regarding aid. As for the aid target, it is outdated although there are merits to focusing on a percentage figure. On the same note, the UK also is focusing on meeting the NATO target of 2% of GDP on defence. Yes, there are claims the UK isn’t meeting that figure but as with 0.7% it is a target the UK adheres towards. In the bigger picture, the accusing of DFID fails to consider that UK aid and aid policy directly and indirectly addresses threats to the UK which complements military expenditure and action. Furthermore, blaming DFID often ignores why the department was founded in the first place and wishing the department to be dissolved would not stop the UK from providing aid for development or foreign policy purposes.[5] Commentators should rather focus on how DFID can add to British defence policy rather that use it as an easy target for accusation.

British SDSRs or national security reviews always generate debates from a wide audience. The constant cacophony of accusing DFID, blaming government officials or believing defence reviews are just about the military. The NSCR is much delayed and the MDP will follow suit. Both of them need rational debates and criticism, not long-standing accusations that do not add to British defence policy.

[1]http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/defence-committee/national-security-capability-review/oral/73765.html . Especially see Q39.

[2] http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/11/26/armed-forces-denied-extra-funding-cash-diverted-cyber-warfare/

[3] http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/01/23/gavin-williamson-wins-new-defence-review-five-months-make-case/

[4] https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/cut-to-marines-will-encourage-our-enemies-9dnnm92sj. The quote behind this paywalled article says “Political masters need to understand that the defence you need is dictated by your enemy, not by economics”.

[5] A good history of DFID’s creation can be found here https://www.cgdev.org/publication/reforming-development-assistance-lessons-uk-experience-working-paper-70 .